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作者: 范似棟   聯邦法院駁回范似棟告美國訴狀 (中英文) 2012-02-25 02:35:30  [点击:9626]
美國地區法院 華盛頓州西區 西雅圖市
范似棟訴美國 案件編號: C11-0718-RSM
法庭決議


I. 案件介紹
法庭審理本案。經認真審閱被告第14號動議,原告的第23號動議,被告第24號動議,以及原告的第25號的動議回應和第26號的動議再回應,綜合平衡,法庭同意被告要求駁回原告的動議。
II. 案件事實背景
此案起因於1983年或前後,自訴原告范似棟在他的出生國—中國的被捕和定罪,當時他是那個國家的居民和公民。 原告聲稱他於1982年的某些時刻訪問上海的美國領事館,目的是了解中國人去美國留學的可能性和向美國官員傳達中國政府迫害政治異議人士的消息。據稱當時的美國領事——戴維 漢斯—表示懷疑中國政府在領事館內案裝竊聽器,因此允許中國的官員傾聽美領館內的談話。表達這樣的疑慮以後,漢斯要求原告參與一個故意安排的談話,當時原告假裝給漢斯一份中國官方文件。如果中國官方問到原告冇關那個故意案排的談話或因此受迫害,美國就可以以此為證據證明美領館內被安裝了竊聽器。
由於考慮到潛在的危險,原告不情願參加這樣的談話,據稱漢斯表示如果他被中國政府逮捕了美國會出力相救。原告聲稱漢斯的這個表示說服他參加這個故意安排的會談,並假裝傳遞中國官方文件給漢斯。
參加了這個故意安排的會談以後,原告聲稱他被中國警方逮捕並被控傳遞官方文件的罪名。原告聲稱他因此被判在中國的一個勞改營監禁十二年。雖然原告聲稱美國政府極盡全力營救—包括美國里根總統向中國政府提議— 原告斷言美國沒有提供關於「故意安排的會談」的無罪證明。原告認為如果美國提供了這個證明,他不會在中國被錯誤判決(第4號動議第4)。
1995年左右原告獲釋,他聲稱他成為美國公民,現在他還居住在美國。原告表示他他曾寫了許多次非正式的努力以求得美國政府幫助他恢復他在中國的名譽。
III. 案件程序背景
原告於2011年4月27日開始這一訴訟,當時的目的是尋求有關冤假錯案法令之下的賠償,要求法庭宣佈他由於政府的疏忽而受損害,和與他的中國判決有關的他的法定程序權利被美國官員侵犯(第1號動議)。
2011年10月5日,被告根據聯邦民事程序法規12(b)(1)和 12(b)(6)提出動議要求駁回原告訴狀(第14號動議)。2011年12月19日原告提交回應,(第23號動議),2011年12月22日被告回應,(第24號動議)。接著原告提出兩個補充備案,一個題為「回應動議」,(第25號動議),另一個題為「再回應動議」,(第26號動議)。法庭把第25號和第26號動議理解為一個。
在原告的回應中,他聲稱他要修改訴狀的事實部分和補充增加欺騙罪的指控。(第23號動議)。根據通常對自訴訴訟當事人的待遇規定, Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, 法庭將考慮原告在回應時的訴訟版本從此以後是「訴狀修改版」,這一版本在這一案件中是有效的。在原告的修改版訴狀中,他明確指出他想通過訴訟得到的賠償是美國政府的「一些書面認可書」,承認原告入獄部分是因為美國官員沒能提交無罪證明。如不能如願以償,原告尋求法庭宣判原告的法定訴訟程序權利被侵犯,以及五千萬美金的補償。
按照以下分析,目前而言法庭設定原告所述事件都是真實的。雖然被告基於法理提出動議要求駁回這個案件,但法庭注意到被告沒有對原告任何事實陳述表示爭議。

IV. 審理標準

A. 訴求不合規範
一個根據聯邦民事訴訟程序法要求駁回對方訴狀的動議必須查驗訴狀中訴求的法理充份性。只有當訴狀中「沒有適當的法定理論」或者「缺少足夠的在適當法理基礎上的事實陳述」,駁回的要求才是可行的。巴力斯崔利訴帕利西卡市警察局, 901 F.2d 696, 699(第九巡迴法院,1988)。 以對方訴狀訴求不合規範而要求駁回對方訴狀的動議,其要點不是在於提出要求者是否說得頭頭是道,而是提出要求者是否有權提出證據以支持他的訴求。吉力根訴加姆克發展公司, 108 F. 3d 246, 249 (第九巡迴法院1997)。 評估一個根據法規 12(b)(6)而作出的動議,法庭必須接受所有訴狀中的實質性的言論,主張或辯解,然後按照最有利於對方的原則進行分解。邦倫 訴 雷區,13 F. 3d 1370 (第九巡迴法院,1994)。法庭沒有被誰要求,但是法庭會接受這樣一種情況,無證據的合法推斷和事實斷言混在一起,不能被合理地分離。克雷格訴克爾特 知名度網絡18F.3d 752, 754-55(第九巡迴法院,1994)。
法規12(b)(6)必須結合法規8(a)一起閱讀理解,後者要求「訴求短小精當,讓人看了覺得應該得到賠償」5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miler, 聯邦慣例和程序 § 1356(1990)。 在法規第八條中有關訴狀標準的條文中說「訴求不明確不合規範就會引起別人的種種猜測。」吉力肯 訴 加姆克發展公司, 108 F. 3d at 248(引文省略)。 因此,一個法庭不能因為司法管轄權而駁回一個訴狀,除非「確實無疑原告不能提供一整套事實來支持他的訴求和得到賠償。」康理 訴 吉伯森, 355 U.S.41, 45-48(1957); 美國 訴.萊達伍特市, 640 F. 2d 963, 966(第九巡迴法庭 1981)。

B. 主題司法管轄權
根據民事訴訟聯邦法規第12(b)(1)而提起的要求駁回對方訴訟的動議需要法庭具冇事項司法管轄權。Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).聯邦法院的司法管轄權是有限的。Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 他們僅僅擁冇美國憲法和法令所賦有的權力,並不按照公正的天意而延伸擴展。同樣的,決定主題司題管轄權的權力掌握在決定司法管轄權的人手裡。同樣的;同樣的,根據法規12(b)(1)考慮駁回動議時,法庭不會局限於原告的訴狀,也會審閱所有證據,比如宣誓書和證詞, 然後決定和司法管轄權有關的事實爭議。McCarthy v. United states, 850 F.2d 558,560(9th Cir. 1988).
進一步說,美國對針對它的訴訟有轄免權,除非它同意被起訴。United States v. Sherwood, 312U.S.584,586(1941). 聯邦侵權行為賠償法(FTCA)規定了聯邦政府在一定的環境下因為其僱員的疏忽犯下的錯誤行為而放棄轄免權的有限範圍。28 U.S.C. §1346(b)(1); United States v. Olson, 546 U.S.43, 44(2005). 聯邦侵權行為賠償法是獨一無二的補救方法,這一方法適用於僱作為個人的原告,原告的目的是尋求賠償,對象是對在一定範圍內的政府僱員的原告所聲稱的扭曲的行為。參閱美國法典28卷2674, 2679節(b)(1); 弗迪克訴克萊弗特, 157F. 3d 697, 706 (第9巡迴法院。1998年).
以聯邦侵權行為賠償法名義的司法訴訟必須先向適當的聯邦機構作行政申訴,如被事實上駁回或者有關聯邦機構在六個月內不於理睬申訴,然後才能成立。28 U.S.C, § 2675(a); Jerves v. United States, 966 F. 2d 517,518 (9th Cir.1992)。 聯邦侵權行為賠償法要求提出訴求者必須呈交他或她的曾經向有關聯邦機構在訴求事項產生後兩年內投訴的證據,否則「針對美國的侵權訴訟」被永遠阻止。28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)。 因為這樣的自然而生的司法管轄權窮盡了,國家主權轄免又再恢復。參閱伯恩斯 訴 美國, 764 F. 2d 722, 724 (第九巡迴法院 1985)。

V. 分析
A. 冤假錯案補救法
雖然原告的訴狀原先大多半寫的是冤假錯案補救法,但是原告自己在修改版訴狀中也承認在這個案件的條件下這不是個好辦法。(23號動議第1頁。)法庭表示同意。原告的有關冤假錯案補救法的訴求因為理解錯誤而被駁回。
B. 疏忽罪
因為美國官員沒有在原告被捕,審訊和定罪時向中國法庭提供無罪證據,原告指控被告犯有疏忽罪。
被告辯駁說,原告的疏忽罪的指控在聯邦侵權索賠法案範圍內,因為原告沒能在訴求成立後兩年內向有關機構提出申訴。14號動議第6頁;24號動議第2頁。 原告回應說多年來他曾給幾任美國總統寫過許多信件這些信件符合聯邦侵權索賠法案的投訴要求。本法庭不同意。
根據相關有效規定,「所謂投訴是指聯邦機構從申訴人那裡收到了申訴,…要有有效的標準形式的表格95或者其它書面通知,通知上有事故的說明,以及要求賠償的金額,財產損失,個人傷害或因事故原因引起的死亡報告。」28 C.F.R. §14.2(a). 雖然原告聲稱他曾為了這個問題多次寫信,打電話和造訪白宮,但他說他這樣做不是為了得到財務賠償,而是為了從克林頓,布什和奧巴馬政府那裡尋求幫助。23號動議第3頁。 的確,原告多次在他的訴求中聲稱他不是為了尋求經濟賠償。參閱4號動議第7,15頁;23號動議11頁。
即使相信原告的訴求所說的他給總統寫了許多信,談他在中國坐牢,但是原告的疏忽罪指控從來沒有按照聯邦侵權索賠法的要求「提交」給有關聯邦機構,因為記錄顯示那些信件中沒有「附帶確定的要求經濟賠償的總額」。28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a)。
而且,原告向有關聯邦機構呈交他的疏忽罪的訴求的時間已經過了規定時間。以聯邦侵權索賠法名義起訴的理由產生於原告知道損害事實及其原因。美國 訴 克伯瑞克, 444 U.S. 111,123(1979)。 因此,當原告1983年入監,那時他已經得知美國官員沒有提交他們答應提交的無罪證明,這一訴求成立。從那個時候開始,原告有兩年時間向美國聯邦政府機構投訴,28 U.S.C. §2401(b), 但是他沒有投訴,這樣法庭就沒有了這一主題的司法管轄權。764 F.2d at 724. 這樣,根據聯邦民事程序法規12(b)(1) 原告的疏忽罪指控必須被駁回。
本法庭不認可由於所謂的「罪證發現規則」,原告不及時投訴可以得到原諒。原告特別提出理由說,即使他相信他的定罪起源於美國官員沒能提交無罪證明, 他的起訴時效應該從2008年起算,那時他從他的律師那裡得到了和他的被捕有關的中國官方文件,他開始掌握了他的定罪起因於那次領事館內「故意安排的會談」。即使接受這些辯解,原告的疏忽罪指控仍然不予成立,因為「以聯邦侵權索賠法名義的訴求產生時間以原告知道或者勤勉的當事人應該知道傷害及其原因的時間起算,而不是延至原告拿到證據的時刻。」 羅克夫斯基 訴 舊金山市和縣535 F. 3d 1044, 1050(第9巡迴法院2008) (黑體字表示強調)。
換句話說,原告知道美國官員沒有提交無罪證據這麼久了,也知道這導致了他的被定罪,雖然幾年後原告才第一次得到證據,但這樣的認知足已建成原告的訢求。在修正版的訴狀中這些事實模式是精確的,但卻不能由此推導出相應的責任。

C. 欺騙罪
原告的欺騙罪指控也存在著與他的疏忽罪指控相同的錯誤。即使原告在尋求欺騙罪的行政賠償方面已經盡力,那個訴求也會遭到駁回,因為聯邦侵權法特別排除針對誤傳的訴訟。 28 U.S.C. §2680. 正如第9巡迴法院認可的,「針對美國的一個美國官員所犯的欺騙罪或誤傳的訴訟被28 U.S.C. §2680(h)絕對禁止。」奧爾西 格萊欣自動分檢公司 訴費爾德 637 F.2d694,697(第9巡迴法院.1981)。相應地,原告的欺騙罪指控因為理解錯誤而被駁回。

D. 其它訴求
最後,原告還提出其它指控,包括聲稱他的法定程序權利被剝奪,任何這類指控都因為針對美國的訴訟一般有6年的時效限制,因此原告的這一指控不予成立。28 U.S.C. §2401(a)。 確切說,任何起源於此案的訟因都產生於1983年,原告表示那一年他被錯誤地監禁。這樣,適用於此案的時效在6年後,即1989年失效。原告沒能在這個時間前之前提出訴訟是訴狀被駁回的另一個原因。
VI. 結論
根據以上理由,被告的第14號動議的駁回原告訴狀的要求得到批準,原告的修改版訴狀因為司法管轄權而被駁回。本法庭強調作出這一裁決的原因僅僅是因為原告的修改版訴狀缺乏法理基礎。本法庭沒有收到任何不利於原告被監禁的不幸故事或相關情況的證據。
原告的第22號動議,該動議要求法庭重新考慮為原告派配法律顧問,也被否決。

頒佈日期:2012年1月23日

_________________________________
理查多 S.馬丁尼斯
美國地區法院法官


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINTON
AT SEATTLE

STONEDONGFAN CASE NO. C11-0718-RSM
PLAINTIFF ORDER
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEFENDANT

I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. #14. Having carefully reviewed the motion, Plaintiff’s response, (Dkt.#23), Defendant’s reply, (Dkt.#24), and Plaintiff’s “Motion for Reply “ and “Motion for Reply Again,”(Dkt. ##25,26), along with balance of the record, the Court GRANYTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the arrest and conviction of Pro se Plaintiff Stone Dong Fan (“Plaintiff”) in his native country of China in or around 1983, at a time when he was a resident and citizen of that country. Plaintiff claims that he visited the U.S. consulate in Shanghai at some point in 1982 in order to discuss the possibility of studying in the United States and to relay information to U.S. officials regarding Chinese suppression of political dissidents. The U.S. consul at the time –David Hess- allegedly expressed suspicion that the Chinese government had “bugged” the consulate building, thereby permitting Chinese officaials to listen in on conversations taking place within the building. After expressing this suspicion, plaintiff claims that Hess asked him to engage in a “sham conversation” during which Plaintiff would pretend to pass Hess an “official” Chinese document. In the event Chinese officials subsequently questioned or punished Plaintiff in connection with the “sham conversation,” the U.S. would take this as evidence that the consulate building was, in fact, “bugged.”
Although Plaintiff expressed reluctance to participate in such a “sham conversation” in light of the potential consequences, Hess allegedly stated that the United States would come to Plaintiff’s assistance in the event he was arrested by the Chinese government. This assurance, Plaintiff claims, convinced him to participate in the “sham conversation” and to pretend that he was passing an “official” Chinese document to Hess.
After participating in this “sham conversation,” Plaintiff claims that he was arrested by Chinese police and charged with the crime of passing an official document. Plaintiff claims that he was sentenced to twelve years of imprisonment in a Chinese labor camp in connection with that charge. Although Plaintiff claims that “the United States government did its best to rescue” him— including overtures from president Ronald Reagan to the Chinese government— he alleges that the U.S. never came forward with exculpatory evidence regarding the nature of the “sham conversation.” Had the United States come forward with this evidence, Plaintiff claims that “he would not have been wrongfully convicted in China.” Dkt. #4 at 4.
Following Plaintiff’s release from prison in or around 1995, he claims to have attained U.S Citizenship, and Plaintiff has now taken up residence in the United States. Plaintiff claims that he has make numerous informal attempts to obtain the assistance of the U.S. government in clearing his name in China.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated the instant action on April 27,2011, seeking a writ of coram nobis, damages, and declaratory relief to remedy the negligence and procedural due process violations that he claims were committed by U.S. officials in connection with his conviction. Dkt. #1.
On October 5, 2011, Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)and 12(b)(6).Dkt.#14. Plaintiff filed a response on December 19, 2011,(Dkt.#23), and Defendant filed a reply on December 22, 2011,(Dkt.#24). Plaintiff later submitted two additional filings: one entitled “Motion for Reply,” (Dkt.#25), and another entitled “Motion for Reply Again,”(Dkt. #26). The Court construes Dkt. ##25 and 26 to be one unified surreply.
In his response, Plaintiff purports to amend his complaint by including additional allegations of fact and a claim for fraud. Dkt. #23. Given the latitude generally afforded to pro se litigants, Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, the Court shall consider the version of the complaint set forth in the response—which the Court will hereafter refer to as the “amended Complaint”—as the operative pleading in this case. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff makes clear that the remedy he seeks to obtain through this litigation is “some written acknowledgment” from the United States government that Plaintiff’s Chinese imprisonment resulted from a failure on the part of U.S. officials to come forward with exculpatory evidence. Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendant violated his due process rights, along with an award of damages in the amount of $50 million.
As explained below, the Court assumes for purposes of the instant Motion that all of the facts alleged by Plaintiff are true. Although Defendant moves to dismiss this case on legal grounds, the Court notes that Defendant has not disputed any of Plaintiff’s factual allegations.

IV.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Failure to State a Claim
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency
of the claims asserted in the complaint. Such dismissal is proper only where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Plice Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699(9th Cir. 1988). The issue on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not whether the claimant will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims asserted. Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F. 3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). When evaluation a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barron v. Reich, 13 F. 3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court is not required, however, to accept ”conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonable be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness netywork, 18F.3d 752, 754-55(9th Cir. 1994).
Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), whick requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miler, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356(1990). The notice pleading standard set forth in Rule 8 establishes “a powerful presumption against refection pleadings for failure to state a claim.” Gilligan, 108 F. 3d at 248(citations omitted). Therefore, a court must not dismiss a complaint with prejudice unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.41, 45-48(1957); U.S. v. City of Redwood City, 640 F. 2d 963, 966(9th Cir. 1981).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) addresses the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They possess only that power authorized by United States Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. Id. The burden of establishing the subject matter jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United states, 850 F.2d 558,560(9th Cir. 1988).
Furthermore, the United States is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued. United States v. Sherwood, 312U.S.584,586(1941). The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provided s limited waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity from liability for negligent of wrongful acts of its employees in certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b)(1); United States v. Olson, 546 U.S.43, 44(2005). The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for individual plaintiffs seeking damages against the Federal government for any alleged tortuous activities of governmental employees acting within the scope of employment. See 28 U.S.C. §§2674, 2679(b)(1); FDIC v Craft, 157F. 3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998).
An action under the FTCA can be instituted only after an administrative claim is presented to the appropriate Federal agency and the claim is denied either actually or constructively by the agency’s failure to act upon the claim within six months. 28 U.S.C, § 2675(a); Jerves v. United States, 966 F. 2d 517,518 (9th Cir.1992). Under the FTCA, a claimant must present his or her administrative claim to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after the claim accrues, or the “tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Because such exhaustion is jurisdictional in nature, it may not be waived. See Burns v. United States, 764 F. 2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985).

V. ANALYSIS
A. Coram Nobis
Although the bulk of the Complaint relates to Plaintiff’s claim for a writ of coram nobis, Plaintiff concedes in the Amended Complaint that a writ of coram nobis is not an available remedy under the circumstances of this case. Dkt. #23 at 1. The Court agrees. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for a writ of coram nobis in dismissed with prejudice.
B. Negligence
Plaintiff argues that Defendant was negligent because U.S. officials failed to come forward with exculpatory evidence that would have assisted him in connection with his arrest, trial, and conviction in the Chinese court.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim of negligence is barred under the FTCA because he has failed to present this claim to the appropriate administrative agency within two years after the claim accrued. Dkt. #14 at 6; Dkt. #24 at 2. Plaintiff responds that he has mailed numerous letters regarding his claim to various U.S. Presidents over the course of many years, and that these letters satisfy the “presentment” requirement set forth in the FTCA. The Court disagrees.
Under applicable regulations, “a claim shall be deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claimant …an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss of property, personal injury, or death alleged to have occurred by reason of the incident.” 28 C.F.R. §14.2(a). Here, although Plaintiff claims to have “repeatedly written, called, and visited the White House” in connection with the issues for which he complains, he claims to have taken these actions not for the purpose of recovering money damages, but “in an effort to request help” from the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. Dkt. #23 at 3. Indeed, Plaintiff has repeatedly stated that he is not seeking monetary damages in connection with his claims. See, e.g., Dkt. #4 at 7, 15; Dkt. #23 at 11.
As such, even when crediting Plaintiff’s claim that he sent various letter to the President regarding his Chinese imprisonment, Plaintiff’s claim of negligence was never “presented” to an appropriated Federal agency for purposes of the FTCA since there is nothing in the record to suggest that those letters were “accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain.”28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a).
Moreover, the time for Plaintiff to present his negligence claim to an appropriate federal agency has long since passed. Indeed, a cause of action accrues under the FTCA when the facts of the injury and its cause are known to the plaintiff. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,123(1979). Plaintiff’s claim therefore accrued when he was imprisoned in 1983, at which time he clearly was aware that U.S. officials had not come forward with the exculpatory evidence they allegedly promised to provide. Plaintiff had two years from that date to present his claim to the appropriate federal agency, 28 U.S.C. §2401(b), and his failure to do so deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Burns, 764 F.2d at 724. As such, Plaintiff’s negligence claim must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s failure to timely present his negligence claim is excused under the so-called “discovery rule.” Plaintiff specifically argues that, even though he has always believed that his conviction stemmed from the failure of U.S. officials to come forward with exculpatory evidence, it was not until 2008— when his lawyer obtained “official” Chinese documents regarding his arrest— that he came to possess evidence that his conviction stemmed from the “sham conversation.” Even when accepting the truth of these allegations, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is still barred because “an FTCA claim accrues when the plaintiff” knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the injury and the cause of that injury, but is not deferred until the plaintiff has evidence of fault.” Lukovsky v. City &County of San Francisco, 535 F. 3d 1044, 1050(9th Cir.2008) (emphasis added).
In other words, so long as Plaintiff knew at the time of his conviction that U.S. officials had failed to come forward with exculpatory evidence, along with the fact that this failure was the cause of his wrongful conviction, such knowledge constitutes accrual of the claims asserted here- even if plaintiff first obtained evidence of these claims only years later. This is precisely the fact pattern alleged in the Amended Complaint, and such facts cannot give rise to liability. Id.

C. Fraud
Plaintiff’s fraud claim suffers from the same defects underlying his negligence claim. But even if Plaintiff had exhausted administrative remedies with respect to his fraud claim, that claim would still be subject to dismissal because the FTCA expressly precludes actions for misrepresentation. 28 U.S.C. §2680. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “claims against the United States for fraud or misrepresentation by a federal officer are absolutely barred by 28 U.S.C. §2680(h).” Owyhee Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F.2d694,697(9th Cir.1981). Accordingly, plaintiff’s fraud claim is dismissed with prejudice.
D. Other Claims
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert other causes of action, including claims based upon an alleged deprivation of due process, any such claims are time-barred under the general six-year statute of limitation applicable to claims against the United States. 28 U.S.C. §2401(a). Indeed, any cause of action stemming from the facts of this case accrued in 1983, when Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully incarcerated. As such, the statute of limitation applicable to any such claims expired six years later, in 1989. Plaintiff’s failure to pursue his claims prior to that time provides yet another reason why his complaint must be dismissed.

VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.#14), is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court emphasizes that its ruling is based solely upon legal deficiencies underlying the Amended Complaint. The Court has not been presented with any evidence to undermine the allegations of Plaintiff’s unfortunate incarceration or the circumstances relating thereto.
Plaintiff’s Motion for reconsideration regarding appointment of counsel (Dkt. #22), is DENIED as moot.
Dated this 23 day of January 2012.



_________________________________
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUD

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