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作者: 范似棟   范似棟告美國案之交叉動議:第24,25,26號 2012-01-29 16:21:43  [点击:8280]
范似棟告美國案之交叉動議:第24,25,26號
(囿於水準,不能保證第24號被告動議譯文完全合乎原意,乞諒。)
被告第24號動議
美國地區法院 華州西雅圖西區
范似棟 原告 對 美國 被告
法院案件編號C11-0718-RSM
法官, 理查多 馬丁尼斯
2011年10月5日,美國提交一個動議,要求法院駁回原告的訴狀。 被告提出理由如下: (1) 原告他沒有申請冤案補救法令的理由,因為該法令在民事案件中無效,而且只在原判法院才生效;(2) 原告沒有在事發兩年內向合適的行政部門提出行政索賠要求,因此被認為沒有盡力尋求在聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)範圍內的行政補救解決。(3)任何針對美國的民事訴訟一般都有6年時效期。(見被告2011年12月19日的14號文件。)
原告回應如下: (1)他讓步並承認他不適宜向這個法院尋求冤案補償法令; (2) 他爭辯他的要求是根據聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA),不存在時效問題; (3) 聲稱新的欺騙罪指控。見本案23號文件。
I.原告沒有盡力尋求聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)範圍內的行政補救解決。
在這個要求駁回的動議中,美國提出:「由於原告沒有在案發後的兩年內向適當的行政部門提出行政訴求,所以被告認為原告沒有盡力進行聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)所要求的行政補救解決。」(見本案14號文件第5-6頁。)美國法規第28卷2401條,聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)對其資格有明確的時效期。 按照規定, 提出聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)要求者需要在訴求產生後兩年內向行政部門提交行政申訴,否則的話「針對美國的侵權訴訟就永遠失效」。(美國法規第28卷2401條(b))。聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)的兩年時效期規定,和其它實質法或程序法規定一樣,是政府主權豁免的一個條件。(美國 v.克白利克, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979))。「 因為它是主權豁免的一個部分,所以及時地提起行政申訴的要求必須嚴格遵守。」(引自同上案例第 117-118。)在原告的回答中,他沒有回應美國的這一駁回理由。他沒有向任何一個行政部門提出申訴。他沒有出示任何證據以證明他曾經進行過任何一項與訴狀有關的行政投訴。僅僅因為這一點,原告的訴狀必須被駁回。
原告辯稱他的指控因為罪證發現規則而不存在時效問題。(見本案文件23號第10頁。) 他聲稱他沒有提起訴訟是因為那時「他沒有掌握物證或書證以證明美國涉及此案」,「要發現美國涉及此案的文字證據很難」。(同上第3,10頁。)原告聲稱他最後於2008年得到了一份中國官方文件,那份文件說明美國是此案的相關當事人。(同上第3,4頁。) 從那以後他尋求從中國政府和美國政府那裡得到直接解決,最後他決定於2011年4月採取法律行動。(同上第10頁。)「通常情況,原告知道或有理由知道傷害是聯邦侵權賠償法相關訴求產生的基礎。」(漢斯力 v. 美國 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008)), (吉伯森 v.美國, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986)). 另外,通常來說,政府僱員出於無知的參與行動與聯邦侵權行為無關。(引自迪尼維茲 v.美國 742 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1984))。
在確定的環境中,比如訴求涉及醫學不當行為事故,在原告知道傷害存在和它的原因之前,基於聯邦侵權賠償法案的訴訟不成立。 (引自克伯力克, 444美國 122-23頁)。但是政府的疏忽,無論真實的還是推斷的,基於聯邦侵權賠償法案的訴訟不取決於原告的知覺或不知覺。相同的道理,原告對疏忽罪的指控,即美國沒能在他的刑事審判時提供無罪證明。依其陳述致使他於1983年被錯判。正像被告所聲稱的,當他最後得到證明美國是案件相關方的官方文件之前,他的基於聯邦侵權賠償法案的訴訟不成立。
被告關於欺騙罪的指控,即原告認為一些具體的政府官員應他的要求對案件的回應是不真實的,誤導的和欺騙的。這些事發生在2002年至2009年期間他收到所謂的回應時。 這樣的話,原告就應該在1985年之前向適當的聯邦代理人投訴疏忽罪,在2004年和2011年之前投訴欺騙罪。因為原告沒有能夠出示他曾經在事發後兩年內或期限的任何時候有過適當的行政投訴,由於缺少主題管轄權,原告的訴狀必須被駁回。
II. 原告的欺騙指控必須被駁回
「即使原告為他所指控的被告的欺騙行為已盡力向行政部門投訴,因為聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)特別拒絕接受對故意的侵權行為的訴訟,所以原告訴狀也應該被駁回。」根據美國法規28卷2680條,任何因為攻擊,猛擊,非法監禁,非法逮捕,惡意起訴,誣告,語言誹謗,文字誹謗,歪曲,欺騙,或者干擾合同權利褗,都被聯邦侵權索賠法排除在外。原告的欺騙罪指控是一種「歪曲」。(參考克拉克 V。美國 2007 WL 2358630 (N.D.Cal. 2007); F.D.I.C. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998); 也參考 奧維西 哥萊欣公司 v. 費爾德 637 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981)) (「根據美國法規28卷第2680條(h),因為一個聯邦官員的行為而指控美國欺騙罪或者歪曲罪被絕對禁止。」)
特別要指出的是,原告聲稱他於2008年得到美國卷入此案的資料,(見本案文件1號第3-4頁), 但是他一直沒有出示任何證據以證明他曾經有過行政投訴,甚至沒有出示在得到資料後的兩年內進行行政投訴的證據。
結論
根據以上所述, 以及根據在美國要求駁回訴狀的本案14號文件中所提出的理由,由於原告沒有提出被告可以接受的解決要求,以及缺乏事項司法管理權,美國敬請法院駁回原告的訴狀。
日期2011年12月22日。
恭敬呈交
美國國家律師珍妮 德凱
美國國家律師助理 克莉絲婷 約翰遜
原告第25號動議
美國地區法院 華州西雅圖西區
范似棟 原告 對 美國 被告
法院案件編號C11-0718-RSM
法官, 理查多 馬丁尼斯
原告范似棟在此回應被告2011年12月22日的動議,陳述如下:
1.被告提出理由:「由於原告沒有在案發後的兩年內向適當的行政部門提出行政訴求,所以被告認為原告沒有盡力進行聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)所要求的行政補救措施」見被告第24號文件第一頁。
在訴狀中原告已經表示他曾多次就此案寫信給美國總統。原告認為白宮是他的行政投訴的適當部門。如果被告不這樣認為請說明理由,或者指示另一個更適當的部門。
2.被告提出理由:「即使原告已為他所指控的被告的欺騙行為已盡力向行政部門投訴,因為聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)特別拒絕接受故意的侵權行為,所以也應該被駁回。」見被告第24號文件的第三頁。
在訢狀中提到的被告欺騙行為與聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)完全無關。被告被指控的属於聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)範圍的僅是「疏忽罪」。見23號文件第6頁。
因此請求法院促成和安排當事雙方庭外解決。
2011年12月29日。
原告范似棟
原告第26號動議

美國地區法院 華州西雅圖西區
范似棟 原告 對 美國 被告
法院案件編號C11-0718-RSM
法官, 理查多 馬丁尼斯
原告范似棟在此再次回應被告2011年12月22日的動議,陳述如下:
1.被告提出理由:「由於原告沒有在案發後的兩年內向適當的行政部門提出行政訴求,所以被告認為原告沒有盡力進行聯邦侵權索賠法(FTCA)所要求的行政補救措施」見被告第24號文件第一頁。
2.被告沒有理由這樣妄下結論。 如果被告律師們認為此案最合適的行政投訴部門是國務院的話,那麼他們會對以下事實感興趣。當原告從中國國拿到有關文件時,他第一時間於2008年10月寄掛號信給美國國務院的中國和蒙古事務科,但是沒有回應。原告又於同年11月又寫信,還是沒有任何回應。這樣,原告才不得不寫給美國總統。這證明了原告的想法,這個案子只有美國總統才能解決,白宮是受理這個行政投訴最合適的行政部門。
3.原告在他的訴狀中沒有提到他曾寫信給國務院這些事,因為: (a).如果讓人們知道了美國國務院沒有回應這一重要信件,人們會認為國務院失職,這樣對國務院不公平; (b). 當時國務院沒有回應,而白宮回應了,不但回了信,還曾經有人從白宮打電話來對原告說,他們收到了信,他們需要開會研究; (c). 原告不認為國務院可以在這個問題上擅作主張,國務院不是原告投訴的最合適部門。
4.這個案件的文件絕對是政治和法律史的一部分,任何一方當事人必須謹慎小心,避免任何偏面的陳述和不公正的結論。如果被告方的律師有疑問,請務必搞清楚才下結論。
日期2012年1月2日
原告范似棟


附件1:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE STONE DONG FAN, ))
Plaintiff, ) NO. C11-0718-RSM )
v.
) UNITED STATES’ REPLY
)UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ))
Defendants. )
______________________________________________________________________
On October 5, 2011, the United States filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
arguing that: (1) he failed to state a claim for relief to obtain a writ of coram nobis because the writ was abolished in civil proceedings such as this, and the writ can only issue in the court in which the conviction was had; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) by failing to file an administrative claim with the appropriate agency within two years of the incident; and (3) any other civil claims against the United States are time barred under the general six-year statute of limitations for claims against the United States. See Dkt. No. 14. On December 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed a response where he:
(1) concedes that he cannot seek a writ of coram nobis from this Court; (2) argues that his claims are brought under the FTCA and are not time-barred; and (3) asserts a new claim for fraud. See Dkt. No. 23.
I. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies under the FTCA.
In its motion to dismiss, the United States argued that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the FTCA because he failed to file an administrative complaint with the appropriate agency within two years of the date it accrues. See Dkt. No. 14, at pg. 5-6.
The FTCA provides an express limitations period for the filing of a tort claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401. Under the terms of the FTCA, a claimant is required to present his administrative claim to the agency within two years after the claim accrues, or the “tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The FTCA’s two-year limitations period, like other substantive or procedural restrictions on FTCA suits, is a condition on the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). Because it is part of the wavier of immunity, the requirement of the filing of a timely administrative claim must be strictly enforced. Id. at 117-118. In his response, Plaintiff fails to address the United States’ argument. He does not claim that he ever presented an administrative claim to any agency. And he does not present any evidence to show that an administrative claim was ever filed based on the facts alleged in the complaint. On this basis alone, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Plaintiff argues that his claims are not time-barred because of “the discovery rule.” See Dkt. No. 23, at pg. 10. He argues that he did not file a claim against the United States earlier because “he had no material evidence or documentary evidence which proves United States involved with the case,” and “it is difficult to find any relevant written evidence of the U.S. government directly involved with this case.” Id. at pg. 3, 10. Plaintiff argues that he finally obtained an “official document” in 2008 that “indicated America was one party concerned of the case.” Id. at pg. 3-4. Since then, he has been trying to obtain relief from the Chinese government and the U.S. government directly, and he finally decided to take legal action in April 2011. Id. at pg. 10. As a general rule, a claim accrues under the FTCA “when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition, as a general rule, ignorance of the involvement of government employees is irrelevant to accrual of a federal tort claim. Id. (citing Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1984)).
In certain circumstances, such as claims involving medical malpractice, accrual does not occur until a plaintiff knows of both the existence of an injury and its cause. Id. (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122-23). But accrual does not await a plaintiff’s awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the government’s negligence. Id. Thus, Plaintiff’s negligence claim -that the United States failed to come forward with exculpatory evidence during his criminal trial -accrued when he was allegedly falsely convicted sometime in 1983. His claim did not accrue, as Plaintiff argues, when he finally obtained “official documentation” showing that the United States was an interested party. 1 Plaintiff’s fraud claim -that certain government officials’ responses to Plaintiff’s inquiries about his case were untrue, misleading, and deceiving -accrued when he received the alleged responses in 2002 and 2009. Thus, Plaintiff was required to file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency on his negligence claim at least by 1985 and on his fraud claim at least by 2004 and 2011. Because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he filed an proper administrative claim within two years of the incident, or any time at all for that matter, Plaintiff’s negligence and fraud should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Plaintiff’s Claim for Fraud Must be Dismissed.
Even if Plaintiff were to have exhausted his administrative remedies on his fraud claim, it
should be dismissed because the FTCA specifically excludes intentional torts. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2680, “any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights” is specifically excepted from the FTCA. Plaintiff’s fraud claim is a type of “misrepresentation.” See Clark v. United States, 2007 WL 2358630 (N.D.Cal. 2007); F.D.I.C. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Owyhee Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. Field, 637 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981) (“claims against the United States for fraud or misrepresentation by a federal officer are absolutely barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)”).
1 Notably, Plaintiff alleges that he obtained information that the United States was involved in 2008 (see Dkt. No. 1, at pg. 3-4), yet he still has failed to present any evidence that he filed anadministrative claim, even within two years of obtaining this information.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and the arguments set forth in the United States’ motion to dismiss, the United States respectfully requests that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
JENNY A. DURKAN
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
KRISTIN B. JOHNSON WSBA #28189
Assistant United States Attorney

附件2:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STONE DONG FAN,
Plaintiff, NO. C11-0718-RSM
v
. JUDGE: RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MOTION FOR REPLY
COMES NOW, STONE DONG FAN as Plaintiff (Pro Se), filed this Motion for reply UNITED STATES’ REPLY Motion which dated 22th day of December, 2011, states as follows:
1. Defendant argued “…Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the FTCA because he failed to file an administrative complaint with the appropriate agency within two years of the date it accrues.” See Dkt. No.24, at pg. 1.
In the complaint Plaintiff has expressed that he wrote several times to the President of the United States about the case.
Plaintiff thinks the White House is the appropriate agency for his administrative claim. Please explain the legal basis and reason if Defendant don’t think so, or show another more appropriate agency for the claim.
2. Defendant argued “Even if Plaintiff were to have exhausted his administrative remedies on his fraud claim, it should be dismissed because the FTCA specifically excludes intentional torts.” See Dkt. No.24, at pg. 3.
The FRAUD in the complaint is totally unrelated with FTCA. Defendant claimed only “The negligence claim against the United States is under the Federal Tort Claims Act.” See Dkt. No.23, at pg.6.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the Court to encourage and arrange settled out of court for both parties as soon as possible.
DATED this 29th day of December, 2011.
___________________________
Stone Dong Fan, plaintiff Pro Se

附件3:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STONE DONG FAN,
Plaintiff, NO. C11-0718-RSM
v
. JUDGE: RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MOTION FOR REPLY AGAIN

COMES NOW, STONE DONG FAN as Plaintiff (Pro Se), filed this Motion for reply again UNITED STATES’ REPLY Motion which dated 22th day of December, 2011, states as follows:
1. Defendant argued “…Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the FTCA because he failed to file an administrative complaint with the appropriate agency within two years of the date it accrues.” See Dkt. No.24, at pg. 1.
2. No reason for Defendant’s attorneys to think or to make this conclusion. If Defendant’s attorneys believe that the most appropriate agency is the State Department, they maybe will be interested in the following fact. When Plaintiff got the document from China, he immediately wrote to the Office for Chinese and Mongolian Affairs of the State Department by certified mail in October 2008, but no reaction. Plaintiff wrote again in November, still no response of any kind. Then Plaintiff had to write to the President of the United States. That proves Plaintiff’s point, this case could be solved only by President of America, and the White House is the appropriate agency for this administrative complaint.
3. In his complaint Plaintiff did not mention it because: (a). It is unfair if people know that the State Department failed to respond an important letter and will think the State Department once neglected its duty; (b). The State Department didn’t do any reply then, and the White House did. In addition to writing, once a call from the White House, said they got the Plaintiff’s letter and would hold a meeting; (c). Plaintiff doesn’t think that it is possible the State Department could make a decision or act on his own on this case. The State Department is not the most appropriate agency for Plaintiff’s administrative claim.
4. The documents of the case in all probability would be part of political and law history, any party should be careful to avoid any incomplete statement and unjust conclusion. If Defendant's attorneys doubt something please make clear before jumping to conclusion.
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2012.
___________________________
Stone Dong Fan, plaintiff Pro Se
Stonefan2003@hotmail.com

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